29 C.F.R. 18 app to Subpart B of Part 18 Reporter's Notes

• Library: Code of Federal Regulations
• Edition: 2023
• Currency: Current through October 31, 2023
• Citation: 29 C.F.R. 18 app to Subpart B of Part 18
• Year: 2023

Reporter's Introductory Note

The Rules of Evidence for the United States Department of Labor modify the Federal Rules of Evidence for application in formal adversarial adjudications conducted by the United States Department of Labor. The civil nonjury nature of the hearings and the broad underlying values and goals of the administrative process are given recognition in these rules.

REPORTER'S NOTE TO §18.102

In all formal adversarial adjudications of the United States Department of Labor governed by these rules, and in particular such adjudications in which a party appears without the benefit of counsel, the judge is required to construe these rules and to exercise discretion as provided in the rules, see, e.g., §18.403, to secure fairness in administration and elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay to the end that the truth may be ascertained and the proceedings justly determined, §18.102. The judge shall also exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment, §18.611(a).

REPORTER'S NOTE TO §18.103

Section 18.103(a) provides that error is not harmless, i.e., a substantial right is affected, unless on review it is determined that it is more probably true than not true that the error did not materially contribute to the decision or order of the court. The more probably true than not true test is the most liberal harmless error standard. See Haddad v. Lockheed California Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1983):

The purpose of a harmless error standard is to enable an appellate court to gauge the probability that the trier of fact was affected by the error. See R. Traynor, [The Riddle of Harmless Error] at 29-30. Perhaps the most important factor to consider in fashioning such a standard is the nature of the particular fact-finding process to which the standard is to be applied. Accordingly, a crucial first step in determining how we should gauge the probability that an error was harmless is recognizing the distinction between civil and criminal trials. See Kotteakos v. United States,328 U.S. 750, 763, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1247, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); Valle-Valdez, 544 F.2d at 914-15. This distinction has two facets, each of which reflects the differing burdens of proof in civil and criminal cases. First, the lower burden of proof in civil cases implies a larger margin of error. The danger of the harmless error doctrine is that an appellate court may usurp the jury's function, by merely deleting improper evidence from the record and assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict below. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65, 66 S.Ct. at 1247-48; R. Traynor, supra, at 18-22. This danger has less practical importance where, as in most civil cases, the jury verdict merely rests on a more probable than not standard of proof.

The second facet of the distinction between errors in civil and criminal trials involves the differing degrees of certainty owed to civil and criminal litigants. Whereas a criminal defendant must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, a civil litigant merely has a right to a jury verdict that more probably than not corresponds to the truth.

The term materially contribute was chosen as the most appropriate in preference to substantially swayed, Kotteakos v. United States,328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed 1557 (1946) or material effect. Holloway v. Arkansas,435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). The word contribute was employed in Schneble v. Florida,405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972) and United States v. Hastings,461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983).

Error will not be considered in determining whether a substantial right of a party was affected if the evidence was admitted in error following a properly made objection, §18.103(a)(1), and the judge explicitly states that he or she does not rely on such evidence in support of the decision or order. The judge must explicitly decline to rely upon the improperly admitted evidence. The alternative of simply assuming nonreliance unless the judge explicitly states reliance, goes too far toward emasculating the benefits flowing from rules of evidence.

The question addressed in Richardson v. Perales,402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) of whether substantial evidence as specified in § 556(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act requires that there be a residuum of legally admissible evidence to support an agency determination is of no concern with respect to these rules; only properly admitted evidence is to be considered in determining whether the substantial evidence requirement has been satisfied.

REPORTER'S NOTE TO §18.104

As to the standard on review with respect to questions of admissibility generally, section 18.104(a), see In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1983) ("The scope of review of the trial court's trustworthiness determination depends on the basis for the ruling. When the trial court makes §18.104(a) findings of historical fact about the manner in which a report containing findings was compiled we review by the clearly erroneous standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52. But a determination of untrustworthiness, if predicated on factors properly extraneous to such a determination, would be an error of law * * * * There is no discretion to rely on improper factors. Such an error of law might, of course, in a given instance be harmless within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. In weighing factors which we consider proper, the trial court exercises discretion and we review for abuse of discretion. Giving undue weight to trustworthiness factors of slight relevance while disregarding factors more significant, for example, might be an abuse of discretion."). Accord, United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509 (lst Cir. 1986).

As to the standard on review with respect to relevancy, conditional relevancy and the exercise of discretion, see, e.g., United States v. Abel,469 U.S. 45, 54, 105 S.Ct. 465, 470, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984) ("A district court is accorded a wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules. Assessing the probative value of common membership in any particular group, and weighing any factors counselling against admissibility is a matter first for the district court's sound judgment under Rules 401 and 403 and ultimately, if the evidence is admitted, for the trier of fact."); Alford v. United States,282 U.S. 687, 694, 51 S.Ct. 218, 220, 75 L.Ed 624 (1931) ("The extent of cross-examination with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court. It may exercise a reasonable judgment in determining when the subject is exhausted."); Hill v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc., 790 F.2d 817, 825 (10th Cir. 1986) ("We recognize that a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant, and its decision will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of clear abuse of that discretion. Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010, 1014 (10th Cir. 1983). The same standard of review applies to a trial court's determination, under Fed.R.Evid. 403, that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its potential to prejudice or confuse the jury, or to lead to undue delay. Id. ").

REPORTER'S NOTE TO §18.201

A.P.A. section 556(e) provides that "when an agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to show the contrary." No definition of "official notice" is provided. An administrative agency may take official notice of any adjudicative fact that could be judicially noticed by a court. In addition "the rule is now clearly emerging that an administrative agency may take official notice of any generally recognized technical or scientific facts within the agency's specialized knowledge, subject always to the proviso that the parties must be given adequate advance notice of the facts which the agency proposes to note, and given adequate opportunity to show the inaccuracy of the facts or the fallacy of the conclusions which the agency proposes tentatively to accept without proof. To satisfy this requirement, it is necessary that a statement of the facts noticed must be incorporated into the record. The source material on which the agency relies should, on request, be made available to the parties for their examination." 1 Cooper, State Administrative Law 412-13 (1965). Accord, Uniform Law Commissioners' Model State Administrative Procedure Act section 10(4) (1961) ("Notice may be taken of judicially cognizable facts. In addition, notice may be taken of generally recognized technical or scientific facts within the agency's specialized knowledge. Parties shall be notified either before or during the hearing, or by reference in preliminary reports or otherwise, of the material noticed, including any staff memoranda or data, and they shall be afforded an...